June 2021 Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior Report

We’re constantly working to find and stop coordinated campaigns that seek to manipulate public debate across our apps.

Purpose of This Report

Over the past four years, we’ve shared our findings about coordinated inauthentic behavior (CIB) we detect and remove from our platforms. As part of our regular CIB reports, we’re sharing information about all the networks we take down over the course of a month to make it easier for people to see the progress we’re making in one place.

Summary of June 2021 Findings

Our teams continue to focus on finding and removing deceptive campaigns around the world — whether they are foreign or domestic. In June, we removed eight networks from seven countries, one of which from Ethiopia we announced earlier in June. The vast majority of these campaigns targeted people in their own countries. We have shared information about our findings with industry partners, researchers, law enforcement and policymakers.

We know that influence operations will keep evolving in response to our enforcement and new deceptive behaviors will emerge. We will continue to refine our enforcement and share our findings publicly. We are making progress rooting out this abuse, but as we’ve said before, it’s an ongoing effort, and we’re committed to continually improving to stay ahead. That means building better technology, hiring more people and working closely with law enforcement, security experts and other companies.

Here are the numbers related to the new CIB networks we removed in June:

  • Total number of Facebook accounts removed: 2,784
  • Total number of Instagram accounts removed: 206
  • Total number of Pages removed: 2,249
  • Total number of Groups removed: 142

Networks removed in June 2021:

  1. Iraq, Iran: We removed 675 Facebook accounts, 16 Pages, and 10 Instagram accounts in Iraq and Iran that targeted audiences in Iraq and were linked to Al-Maaref Radio in Iraq and Alborz Analysis and Development, an IT firm in Tehran. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
  2. Jordan: We removed 89 Facebook accounts, 35 Pages, three Groups, and 16 Instagram accounts in Jordan that targeted primarily domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Jordan including those associated with the Jordanian military. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
  3. Algeria: We removed 130 Facebook accounts, 221 Pages, 35 Groups, and 29 Instagram accounts in Algeria that targeted primarily domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Algeria, including some who worked for the 2019 campaign of the current President. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
  4. Sudan: We removed 53 Facebook accounts, 51 Pages, three Groups, and 18 Instagram accounts in Sudan that targeted domestic audiences and were linked to individuals in Sudan including those associated with the Future Movement for Reform and Development, a political party in Sudan. We found this network after reviewing information about some of its activity shared by researchers at Valent Projects.
  5. Mexico: We removed 1,621 Facebook accounts, 1,795 Pages, 75 Groups, and 93 Instagram accounts in Mexico that focused on the state of Campeche and were linked to individuals in that state, including those working for Worgcorp, a political strategy and public relations firm in Mexico. We found this activity as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the Mexican elections.
  6. Mexico: We removed 122 Facebook accounts, 69 Pages, and four accounts on Instagram in Mexico that targeted domestic audiences in Nayarit and Sinaloa states and were linked to two PR firms in Mexico — Global Consultoria and Pro Publicity. We found this network after reviewing public reporting in Mexico about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the election in June.
  7. Mexico: We removed 32 Facebook accounts, 23 Pages, and four Instagram accounts in Mexico that focused on domestic audiences in the San Luis Potosi state and were linked to individuals associated with Ricardo Gallardo Cardona’s political campaign. We found this activity after reviewing information shared by researchers at the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensics Research Lab about suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region and removed it ahead of the June election.
  8. Ethiopia: We removed 62 Facebook accounts, 49 Pages, 26 Groups, and 32 accounts on Instagram in Ethiopia that targeted domestic audiences and were linked to individuals associated with INSA, the Information Network Security Agency in Ethiopia. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. (Originally announced on June 16, 2021)

Learn More About Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior

We view CIB as coordinated efforts to manipulate public debate for a strategic goal where fake accounts are central to the operation. There are two tiers of these activities that we work to stop: 1) coordinated inauthentic behavior in the context of domestic, non-government campaigns and 2) coordinated inauthentic behavior on behalf of a foreign or government actor.

Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB)
When we find domestic, non-government campaigns that include groups of accounts and Pages seeking to mislead people about who they are and what they are doing while relying on fake accounts, we remove both inauthentic and authentic accounts, Pages and Groups directly involved in this activity.

Foreign or Government Interference (FGI)
If we find any instances of CIB conducted on behalf of a government entity or by a foreign actor, we apply the broadest enforcement measures including the removal of every on-platform property connected to the operation itself and the people and organizations behind it.

Continuous Enforcement
We monitor for efforts to re-establish a presence on Facebook by networks we previously removed. Using both automated and manual detection, we continuously remove accounts and Pages connected to networks we took down in the past.

See the full report for more information.


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this post was first published on About Facebook

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